

Observations Concerning the Premises of the Coming “Great War” in Europe

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The United States seeks to reduce or potentially withdraw from NATO for several reasons.

Despite a significant decline in its industrial base, the United States remains a major industrial power. With the rise of China as a global economic competitor and the increasing economic influence of Germany within Europe - combined with the close economic relationship between Germany and China - the United States faces two major challenges: its current account deficit and its trade deficit. From this perspective, the principal structural rivals of the United States are China and Germany, not Russia.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has largely continued to rely on the infrastructure, military capabilities, and strategic assets inherited from the USSR. At the same time, it no longer represents a distinct political or socio-economic model, nor does it possess the industrial capacity that once characterized the Soviet state. Under Putin, Russia increasingly transformed into an economy centered on the export of natural resources and energy rather than industrial production (Putin, in fact, willingly supervised the destruction of Russia's autonomous and full cycle industry, in exchange for its access to the WTO).

Therefore, from a hard structural perspective, Russia is not the primary adversary of the United States; rather, China and Germany - just behind China - occupy that position.

Additionally, Russia and Germany are also natural competitors in Eastern Europe, the Baltic region, Central Europe, and the Balkans. On one side stands Germany, a nation of roughly 80 million people with a highly developed industrial economy. On the other stands European Russia, with approximately 100 million people, rich in natural resources and heavily armed through the legacy of Soviet military power. Both project influence into many of the same strategic regions and spheres of interest.

Also, on this subject matter, Ukraine provides a clear example. In the ongoing regional conflict involving Russia, Germany has been one of Ukraine's principal supporters, with Turkey also playing a significant role.

As a result, Germany and Russia tend to expand their influence into the same geopolitical spaces. And they are polar-opposite powers by weight and space (over the same portion of the world). Their coexistence, with this growing and centralizing power (more and more, year after year), is therefore marked by unresolvable structural contradictions involving opposing state interests, ruling elites, economic systems, and competing spheres of influence. Because both the two powers seek influence over many of the same regions, and this rivalry, on the medium run, can only be resolved by conflict and by the annihilation of one of the two (and vice versa from the reciprocal position of their ruling classes).

A further subject matter, involved in this huge contradiction, concerns the ruling classes of the United Kingdom and France, and, only secondly, to some extent those of the United States. If the two World Wars were fought in part to prevent Germany from establishing dominance over Europe through economic and political power, then it is difficult to see why London and Paris would welcome a European Union increasingly dominated by Germany. From this viewpoint, it would appear contradictory to have fought two devastating wars only to allow German influence to become predominant through economic integration and institutional networks (all happening peacefully, under their noses).

Consequently, even if they didn't happen yet publicly and in public politics, structurally, political developments within France and the United Kingdom / England are being seeded behind the scenes and they eventually will lead to a more openly critical stance against Germany's role within Europe (against its power, its industry, its influence, its networks, etc). Even now, their strategic elites have been wary of the growing concentration of power within Germany using the European Union as its extension over Europe.

In such a scenario, the question arises: would France and England, when push comes to shove, align more closely with Germany than with Russia?

According to what was highlighted, they would ultimately favor Russia, because Germany represents the greater long-term challenge to their relative influence, power, and geopolitical position.

Therefore, even though I am sure there are inner divisions inside their behind the scenes ruling classes (especially for France, due to all the influence their big businesses have in the Eurochambres a side of Germany's and the Benelux's), in the end, they will always - for necessity - side with Russia against Germany (and have more interest in the containment of Germany than viewing Russia as an enemy).

To be kept in mind:

- When in the XVIII century France wanted to take an hegemonic position both over the oceans and over Europe, England sided with the Habsburgs, at the East of France, to contain France;
- When in the XIX century France was the continental power over Europe, at the time of Napoleon, England sided with Russia against the European power;
- When in the XX century Germany, in World War I and in World War II, tried to take a hegemonic position over Europe, England sided with Russia against Germany;

Therefore:

- When in the XXI century push comes to shove and there will be a current/future siding of Germany against Russia, because Germany is the hegemonizing power over Europe, England will side with Russia against Germany once more.

Thus, although the United States must increasingly focus on China and the Indo-Pacific region, and although France and the United Kingdom still have to undergo internal political shifts before openly expressing explicit antagonism and opposition against German predominance, all three powers would, according to this perspective, be inclined to side with Russia rather than Germany.

Their overriding objective would be the preservation of their own influence, strategic advantages, and international networks of power.

If Nato was created in the post-WWII order to justify and defend the US conquests parts of Europe as the results of the last World War - in that order and in the Cold War and in the '90s (after

the fall of the USSR), was all for the interest of the USA having a frame to justify in peace their presence and influence... With the deindustrialization of the USA, due to the industrialization of China, and their waning power. With the fact that the US presence in Europe deters the war of Russia against Germany. With the fact that right after China it is Germany the second structural competitor of the US. With the fact that Germany is using the EU as the instrument to hegemonizing vast parts of Europe under its structural and economic and power influence. Etc., etc., etc. In front of all of this: why would the US remain here in Europe, in Nato, to defend Germany?

Why should the US stay in Nato to defend Germany while Germany is hegemonizing Europe instead Nato being a mere tool of preserving US own power over Europe?

Why should the US defend Germany while Germany, right after China, is the second structural competitor of the US (contributing, probably the most or almost the most, right after China, to its (a) trade balance deficit, (b) current account balance deficit, (c) consequently their mainland deindustrialization... Keeping in mind that the first cause is China, right after Beijing comes Berlin).

Therefore, in front of all of this, the US, evidently, with balanced paces, orderly, step by step, will withdraw from Nato / Europe, they won't keep defending Germany, and internationally and strategically, at world level, they will align more with Russia.

This is, in an extremely hard empirical quantifiable facts base synthesis, of why - in the medium period - the US will withdraw and exit physically from Nato.